Digital Commons @ Assumption University
Political Science Department Faculty Works

Political Science Department

2014

The Founding Fathers: A Conserving Caucus in Action
George W. Carey
Georgetown University

Greg Weiner
Assumption College, gs.weiner@assumption.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.assumption.edu/political-science-faculty
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Carey, George W. and Greg Weiner. "The Founding Fathers: A Conserving Caucus in Action." Modern Age
vol. 56 no. 1 (Winter 2014): 29-41. https://home.isi.org/founding-fathersbr-conserving-caucus-action.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science Department at Digital Commons @
Assumption University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Department Faculty Works by an
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Assumption University. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@assumption.edu.

ESSAY

THE FOUNDING FATHERS
a conserving caucus in action
George W. Carey and Greg Weiner

S

everal fine and highly readable accounts
of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention have appeared over the decades.
What characterizes most of these works—as
well as, we should add, the countless articles
dealing with the Convention—is their focus
not only on the delegates, their backgrounds
and views, but also on the conflicts that
arose between them during their deliberations. Perhaps most prominent among these
readings is John Roche’s seminal essay “The
Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in
Action,” which casts delegates to the Convention as politicians rather than as theorists
and emphasizes their employment of compromise to overcome conflict.1 The result,
Roche writes, is that “the careful observer of
the day-to-day work of the Convention finds
no over-arching principles.” Such principles
as appear to exist, he suggests, were retrospective justifications applied to the products
of compromise. This focus is quite understandable, if for no other reason than that it

provides a context for a better understanding
of the dynamics of the Convention, how
differences of interest and theoretical persuasion were reconciled, and why the Constitution took the form it did. Such is the case,
to take the most dramatic example, with the
well-known account of the “large state, small
state controversy” that almost resulted in the
breakdown of the Convention.
Yet this portrait of the Philadelphia Convention as a “reform caucus” overlooks the considerable extent to which the delegates were
constrained by, and therefore only relatively
modestly modified, long-established political
forms in use in the American colonies and
states for decades. This is to say, they showed
an inclination to follow John Dickinson’s
admonition, “Experience must be our only
guide. Reason may mislead us.”2 In this sense,
the Convention was less a reform caucus than
a conserving one. Indeed, while it is undeniably true that the delegates were skilled at
the art of compromise, the Convention was
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also characterized by a remarkable degree of
consensus on fundamental matters of governance. This consensus reached not merely the
republican underpinnings of the regime but
also several particulars as to its form, such as
bicameralism and the separation of powers.
Roche correctly notes that the framers were
not abstract theorists, but they were theoretically sophisticated. The general absence of
abstract theory in their debates may largely
reflect the fact that few fundamental theoretical issues were in dispute; on the contrary,
such conflicts as did exist pertained largely to
the best practical means of realizing ideals on
which the overwhelming proportion of delegates agreed. The sheer magnitude of the task
before the delegates—that of uniting independent and largely sovereign states under
one government—would probably have been
impossible lacking a consensus on the basic
principles of governance. Moreover, given the
speed with which the Convention completed
its work, this consensus clearly had to embrace
a number of concrete matters of governance,
principally those relating to the procedures
and structures of government necessary for
the realization of the basic principles.
Equally important, a major source of this
consensus, we believe, is to be found in the
American political tradition, starting with
the principles and practices of government
stretching back to the earliest colonial
times. Prior forms provided the basis of
broad consensus and set practical boundaries to the options available to the framers.
Consequently, the most important areas of
consensus did not need to be “arrived” at
or achieved by compromise to begin with;
they were supplied by experience. To put
this otherwise, if we place the Philadelphia Convention and its handiwork into a
broader historical perspective, we encounter
again a trait in the American political tradition that was evident in the period leading
30
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up to the Revolution, that which Friedrich
von Gentz identified as a “lack of abstract
theory.”3 On Gentz’s showing, the American
Revolution, quite unlike the French, could
even be considered reactionary, since the
colonists sought a return to the conditions
that prevailed during the colonial period of
“salutary neglect.”
We do not mean to suggest that the framers
were copycats. Clearly this was not the case.
Nor could it be, given the need to address the
delicate issues surrounding federalism and
what the role of the states in the structure
and processes of the new government should
be, matters about which the political tradition was largely silent. Moreover, they looked
upon their political institutions and tradition
with a critical eye, acknowledging the failures and weaknesses of state constitutions.
In this sense, the prior experiences indicated
what avenues should not be traveled, or they
pointed to potential dangers in some of the
institutional or procedural arrangements
set before the Convention. Yet, as even this
“negative” role reveals, the political tradition
served to establish crucial parameters in the
debates and deliberations of the Convention;
that is, it not only provided the common
grounds and shared experiences for a meaningful exchange of views; it also limited the
range of potential alternative arrangements
the framers would consider.
This consensus reached a remarkable array
of issues that covered virtually the full range
of questions political theorists might ask
about a new regime, including its form—
republican—and such institutional arrangements as separation of powers. The Virginia
Plan, the template on which the Convention’s deliberations were based, supplies a
compelling example. Virtually every feature
of it that received serious consideration by
the delegates can be clearly traced to prior
forms. The plan of a lower house electing an
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upper house—famously attributed to James
Madison’s study of David Hume4—in fact
appears in the colonies as early as the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut and in the
postrevolutionary constitutions of Georgia
and South Carolina, as well as in Charles
Pinckney’s draft of a national plan of government.5 Its commitments to bicameralism
and establishment of three separate branches
of government, as will be seen below, mirror nearly the entirety of state constitutions.
The Council of Revision, comprising representatives from the executive and judicial
branches, was based on a similar institution
in New York. Only the national negative on
state laws could be called innovative, yet this
measure pertained largely to federalism and
was, in any event, less a source of controversy
at the Convention than a simple nonstarter
that never stood a serious chance.
Similarly—and in stark contrast to the
many historical accounts that emphasize the
possibility that abuses of popular rule might
drive the nation to monarchy—the delegates
evince an almost unanimous consensus that
the new government would not only be
republican but would also tilt toward the
populist end of the republican spectrum.
Once the decisive question of whether the
new regime would operate on individuals
was settled, no one questioned that its center
of gravity would be a lower house elected by
the people for relatively brief terms. Indeed,
given the paucity of evidence to the contrary,
it is difficult to see how the idea that republicanism was in danger ever took such a strong
hold on the historiography of the founding. The Convention never considered any
regime other than republican; and, indeed,
so prevalent was the consensus in favor of the
republican form that the rare comments raising concerns about that prospect are notable
chiefly for the almost bashful tone of apology
that attended them. Dickinson, for example,

spoke admiringly on June 2 of the British
system, but hastened to add that a “limited
Monarchy however was out of the question.”
Hamilton, for his part, was sufficiently selfconscious about his British-style proposal on
June 18 that he had to beg “Gentlemen of
different opinions [to] bear with him” on the
subject.
To be sure, disagreement over various
aspects of these principles and how best they
could be secured was substantial, though
nowhere near as intense as that over a range of
issues surrounding federalism (for example,
what the role of the states should be in the
central government, the extent of national
power vis-à-vis the states)—the one issue,
again, on which the tradition provided the
least guidance. Nevertheless, the delegates—
all of whom at least acknowledged the
need for a stronger national government—
recognized the necessity of tackling these
issues. In relatively short order, consensus
on these matters produced an understanding
that the Articles of Confederation had to
be abandoned, that the Convention would
have to ignore that part of their instructions
officially authorizing the Convention “for
the sole and express purpose of revising the
Articles of Confederation.” Thus, in several
key areas of the Convention’s work, we can
see broad consensus bounded by experience:
Abandonment of Articles and Scope of
National Powers. The introduction of the
Virginia (or Randolph) Plan on May 29,
just the third working day of the Convention, was a clear indication that the Articles
of Confederation would be scrapped. This
plan abandoned the defining characteristics of the confederate model: its key
institution—the “prime mover,” so to speak,
within the system—was a popularly elected
lower chamber of a bicameral legislature,
with its representation proportioned among
the states according to population, and its
31
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laws operating upon individuals rather than
the states. To be sure, there were some who
believed that the Convention, in deliberating
on the Virginia Plan, was going beyond its
mandate from Congress or the instructions
of their state legislatures. On May 30, for
instance, George Read of Delaware points
out that “deputies from Delaware were
restrained by the commissions from assenting to any change of the rule of suffrage”
from that of equality of state representation.
The major assault on the Virginia Plan comes
on June 9 from William Paterson, who goes
beyond charging that the Convention was
acting beyond its legal authority in abandoning equal state representation to maintaining that such abandonment would not be
endorsed by the people.
Paterson’s remarks, as well as his introduction on June 15 of the Small State or New Jersey Plan as an alternative to the Virginia Plan,
however, must be placed in context. In many
ways, his plan conformed to the Convention’s
official mandate simply to alter the Articles,
although, taken as a whole, these alterations
were substantial. For instance, it did go a long
way in meeting the objectives of those who
wanted a stronger union, such as that envisioned in the Virginia Plan, by granting the
central government taxing powers and control
over interstate and foreign commerce, and by
providing as well that its laws would be the
“supreme law of the respective States.” This
scope of federal powers extended to most of
the same areas in which the Virginia Plan proposed to empower the national government.
It did not, to be sure, include farther-reaching
ideas such as Madison’s national negative on
state laws. But the important point to observe
is that the divisions between the two pertained not to the scope of federal powers but
rather to the institutional forms necessary to
ensure that the states did not encroach on the
national regime—a possibility all understood
32
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to be a potential problem, as indicated by
Paterson’s proposal to empower the national
government to enforce the collection of taxes
within the states.
The differences in institutional forms, to
be sure, were no small things, but we can also
see that the authority accorded to the national
government by both the Virginia and New
Jersey Plans reflects a remarkable degree of
consensus within the Convention on matters that would, in the ratification debates,
prove highly controversial. It would not be
an exaggeration to say the plans agreed on all
the important questions of authority. While
other features of the New Jersey Plan—for
example, those relating to the judiciary and
plural executives—were not likely to gain
much support in the Convention, the most
notable and controversial provision was for a
unicameral legislature with equality of state
representation; that is, the retention of the
Congress established by the Articles with
even more extensive responsibilities. That
Paterson would advance such a proposal in
light of what had already transpired is, we
believe, best understood as taking an extreme
position to establish a “bargaining” stance
from which a compromise could be secured
that would embrace proportional representation in one chamber and equality of state
representation in the second. Moreover,
Paterson’s plan did not reflect any theoretical hostility to bicameralism: if the Congress
was going to continue to serve as essentially
a diplomatic body, the theoretical need for
a second chamber dissipates. In any event,
only two days—largely consisting of withering critiques by Wilson and Madison—are
devoted to a discussion of Paterson’s plan.
The abandonment of the Articles is rendered
official on June 19 by a vote of 7–3, with the
Maryland delegation divided, to abandon
further consideration of the Paterson Plan
and return to a consideration of the Virginia
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Plan as “altered, amended, and agreed to.”
The issue of representation in the second
chamber, however, remained and would
prove troublesome.
The Separation of Powers. In Federalist No. 47, Madison writes of separation
of powers that “no political truth is . . . of
greater intrinsic value, or . . . stamped with
the authority of more enlightened patrons of
liberty.”6 A survey of the state constitutions
adopted after the Declaration of Independence would seem to bear out Madison’s
appraisal. Of the six states that prefaced their
constitutions with a statement or declaration
of rights, four expressly called for the separation of the three branches of government.
The “Declaration of Rights” for the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 contains
the most elaborate statement regarding this
separation and its purpose: “. . . the legislative
department shall never exercise the executive
and judicial powers, or either of them; the
executive shall never exercise the legislative
and judicial powers, or either of them; the
judicial shall never exercise the legislative
and executive powers, or either of them, to
the end that it [the Massachusetts government] may be a government of laws and
not of men.” The first article in the body of
the Georgia Constitution of 1777 is more
succinct: “The legislative, executive, and
judiciary departments shall be separate and
distinct, so that neither exercise the powers
properly belonging to the other.”
While other state constitutions were not
as explicit as Georgia’s, their basic frames of
government clearly reveal a concerted effort
to adhere to this principle. It bears emphasis
that these rhetorical declarations of devotion
to the separation of powers appear in the
revolutionary constitutions as an explicit
theoretical justification for institutions that
had long evolved—a self-conscious invocation of the authority of Montesquieu.

So prevalent was Montesquieu’s authority
on this matter—he has been rated as the
most often cited theoretical figure on the
American shores during the era7—that any
departure from the principle of separation of
powers would have required clear justification. It is the absence of such commentary,
not the presence of it, that proves the extent
of consensus on this principle.
Thus, it is not surprising that the Virginia
Plan embraced the separation of powers,
even though Madison himself would come
to regard its protections for the principle as
insufficient. That the Paterson Plan, which
sought to salvage the Articles, also incorporated separation of powers might, at first
blush, seem unusual. Yet the mere fact that
this plan provided for an energetic government that could enforce its will upon the
states, quite unlike the state of affairs under
the Articles, necessitated a division of powers
in order to have any chance of success within
the Convention.
Following on the analysis of Montesquieu,
Federalist No. 47 makes it clear that the
purpose of separation of powers is to prevent
arbitrary rule. The decisive point to notice is
that the Convention was undivided on the
importance of that principle. The fault lines
that emerged centered not on the theoretical foundations of separation of powers but
rather on different opinions as to the institutional threats to it and the proper institutional responses: some delegates wanted
to strengthen the executive and judiciary
against an encroaching legislature; others,
to weaken the presidency lest its occupant
become tyrannical; and still more favored a
strict and inviolable separation between all
three branches. But the separation of powers
was not an accidental by-product of extraneous institutional debates.
The degree of consensus surrounding the
separation of powers is evident in the fact that
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certain important lines pertaining to it were
drawn early in the proceedings. The Virginia
Plan called for a Council of Revision that
would empower “the Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary” to
veto measures passed by the legislature. Both
Madison and James Wilson were persistent
and forceful proponents of uniting the judiciary with the executive, seeking adoption of
this provision on June 6 and July 21 without
success. What can rightly be called a third
effort, on August 15, took the form of allowing either “the Executive” or the “Supreme
Judiciary Departments” to exercise a veto: if
both vetoed, “3/4 of each House” would be
required to override; if only one, “2/3 of each
House.” This proposal was soundly rejected
by an 8–3 vote.
Why were Madison and Wilson so persistent in seeking this union of the two departments? The reason was to retain rather than
to jettison the separation of powers. The
principal justification for their efforts is to
be found in Madison’s remarks of July 17 to
the effect that at the state level the legislatures have aggrandized virtually all powers
and that a meaningful separation of powers therefore does not obtain. He notes as
well that “the Executives of the States are
in general little more than Cyphers; the
legislatures omnipotent.” On July 21 he
repeats his concern in even more alarming
and specific terms: “Experience in all the
States had evinced a powerful tendency in
the Legislature to absorb all power into its
vortex. This was the real source of danger to
the American Constitutions; & suggested
the necessity of giving every defensive
authority to the other departments that was
consistent with republican principles.” On
August 15, Wilson points out that, while
tyranny was most commonly associated
with a “formidable” “Executive,” “where
the Executive is not formidable” tyranny
34
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should appropriately be linked with the
legislature.
Thus, their primary purpose was to
protect the two weaker departments, the
executive and judiciary, from legislative
aggrandizement—again, to preserve the
separation of powers in practice. As Wilson
put this at an earlier point in the debates, on
July 21, “the joint weight of the two departments was necessary to balance the single
weight of the Legislature.” Equally important, however, such a union would render
the exercise of the veto power in the face of
legislative aggrandizement more likely. The
executive standing alone might not have the
confidence, firmness, or courage, deficiencies overcome by uniting with the judiciary.
Yet Madison, speaking on the same day,
doubted that even this union of executive
and judicial branches would do the job; “the
Legislature,” he believed, “would still be an
overmatch for them.”
The debate over the Council of Revision
assumes importance because its opponents,
while not opposed to the ends sought by its
proponents, hold to a vision of separated
powers and what its implementation required
that eventually wins out and finds expression
in the Constitution. On June 6 Dickinson
succinctly set forth the overriding objection,
namely, that the “junction of the Judiciary”
with the executive branch “involved an
improper mixture of powers.” Earlier, on
June 4, Elbridge Gerry, apparently the most
vocal opponent of this provision, observed
that judging “the policy of public measures”
was “foreign” to the judicial function. Following upon this, Rufus King maintained
that “the Judges ought to be able to expound
the law as it should come before them, free
from the bias of having participated in its
formation.” Caleb Strong, on July 21, makes
essentially the same point: “The Judges
in exercising the function of expositors
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might be influenced by the part they had
taken . . . in framing the laws.” Luther Martin is even more emphatic in rejecting any
role for the judges in the legislative process
on largely different grounds: “A knowledge
of Mankind, and of Legislative affairs cannot be presumed to belong in a higher degree
to the Judges than to the Legislature.” Not
unrelated to Martin’s objection is Pinckney’s
observation regarding Madison’s final proposal of August 15 that “the interference of
the Judges in the Legislative business . . . will
involve them in parties, and give a previous
tincture to their opinions.”
Looking at this dispute from a wider perspective, the major difference between those
who favored this combination of executive
and judicial powers and those who opposed
it revolved around their respective estimates
of the capacity of the legislature to overwhelm the executive and judicial branches.
All, however, were united in a theoretical
commitment to separation of powers, which
in fact motivated these other disputes.
Greatly influenced, no doubt, by what they
witnessed taking place in the states after
independence, those who sought to fortify
the executive called for checks on the legislature that would be extremely difficult to
overcome. Indeed, some suggested that the
only sure remedy against legislative tyranny
resided in giving the executive an absolute
veto.8 Those opposed to these measures simply did not view the legislative threat in such
an apocalyptic light.
At the same time, a wider perspective also
reveals fundamental grounds of agreement
that in the end served to facilitate compromise on one of the most critical issues
confronting the Convention. Put otherwise,
even though the proposal to unite the executive and judicial branches to fend off legislative encroachments was rejected, there was
still a consensus that the executive needed a

check on the legislature in order to prevent
tyranny from that quarter. As Nathaniel
Gorham observed during the debate on July
21, the last time the Council of Revision
was proposed, “All agree that a check on the
legislature is necessary.” And in fact, from
an early stage in the deliberations (June 4),
a solid majority backed an executive veto
power whose override would require a twothirds vote in both legislative chambers—
the same requirement for an override of a
governor’s veto contained in the New York
and Massachusetts constitutions.
The disputes surrounding these issues
were, to be sure, substantial, but they should
not obscure the degree to which the delegates
were, so to speak, deliberating in the same
political universe. That is, they understood
the need for the separation of powers; they
did agree that the legislature would have
to be checked; they did appreciate the reasons underlying their differences; and they
were mindful of how their decisions would
impinge upon other basic values, not the
least of these being republicanism. In short,
they shared the same basic objectives. Their
eventual resolution of these differences came
down to a matter of judgment: Would, for
example, the independence of the judiciary
suffer from even a partial union with the
executive? Would a three-fourths override
provision render the president too powerful?
Would a two-thirds provision be sufficient to
prevent legislative encroachment?
The issue of who should elect the president
perhaps better illustrates the fundamental
agreement on principle that pervaded the
deliberations. The Virginia Plan provided
for the election of the executive by the combined chambers of the legislature. Early in
the deliberations key issues arise that will
later be debated at some length: Who should
elect the executive—the legislature or the
people—and what should be his term of
35
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office? On June 13 the Committee of the
Whole reports on the Randolph Resolutions
affirming the Convention’s prior decision
that the executive be elected by the national
legislature for a term of seven years, adding
the proviso that he “be ineligible a second
time.”9 On July 17 the delegates vote unanimously for election by the national legislature but also, on a 6–4 vote, eliminate the
proviso barring reeligibility. On this issue
the delegates apparently accepted Gouverneur Morris’s July 17 view that “ineligibility . . . tended to destroy the great motive to
good behavior, the hope of being rewarded
by a re-appointment. It was saying to him,
make hay while the sun shines.”
The ramifications of the decision to allow
for reeligibility were almost immediately
apparent. Jacob Broome indicated that with
reeligibility he was now for a shorter terms
of office, preferring a longer term if “he had
remained ineligible.” But James McClurg, in
moving “to strike out the 7 years, and insert
‘during good behavior,’ ” raised the issue that
hit to the heart of the separation-of-powers
principle. By eliminating the ineligibility
clause, he argued, the executive “was put
into a situation that would keep him dependent forever on the Legislature; and he
conceived the independence of the Executive
to be equally essential with that of the Legislature.” McClurg’s motion was supported by
Gouverneur Morris, who at the same time
indicated that “he was indifferent how the
Executive should be chosen, provided he
held his place by this tenure.”10
Madison, in more extensive remarks, reiterated the point that “the Executive could
not be independent of the Legislature, if
dependent on the pleasure of that branch
for a reappointment.” Invoking the authority
of Montesquieu, he pointed to the consequences of a union of these two branches:
“tyrannical laws may be made that they
36
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may be executed in a tyrannical manner.”
While it should be noted that even though
Madison—unlike Wilson, with whom he
shared almost identical views on the need
for separation of powers—never endorsed
life tenure for the executive, he nevertheless
felt that McClurg’s motion deserved “a fair
hearing & discussion, until a less objectionable expedient” could be found to prevent
legislative tyranny.
George Mason regarded “during good
behavior” to be only “a softer name for an
Executive for life,” and he raised the specter
of a “hereditary Monarchy”; an “easy step,”
in his view, if the “good behavior” provision
were adopted. This charge drew denials of
any such intention from McClurg, Madison,
and Gouverneur Morris. Perhaps the most
incisive of these was Madison’s argument
that the preservation of republican government “required some expedient for the purpose” of restraining the legislature, but “in
devising it” that “the genuine principles of
that form . . . be kept in view.”
On July 19, presumably in light of the difficulties attendant upon reeligibility, a majority voted in favor of a motion by Oliver Ellsworth for election by electors “appointed by
the Legislators of the States” using a formula
that would take state population into account
in allotting electoral votes. But by July 24 a
majority reversed this decision and returned
to election by the national legislature, which
prompted Gerry and Martin to move “to reinstate the ineligibility of the Executive a 2d
time.” Gerry, acknowledging the need for an
executive independent of the legislature, went
on to contend that “the longer the duration
of his office the more will his dependence [on
the legislature] be diminished,” and he suggested terms of “10, 15, or even 20, years and
[that he] be ineligible afterwards.”
Clearly there were those such as Gouverneur Morris for whom reeligibility was
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critically important and who, therefore,
could not accept any provision along the
lines suggested by Gerry. King, for instance,
stated that reeligibility was “too great an
advantage for the small effect it will have on
his independence.” It is with this in mind
that Wilson, recognizing the difficulties
that “spring from the mode of election,” set
forth a proposal designed to overcome them
and allow for reeligibility: “the Executive be
elected for 6 years, by a small number, not
more than 15 of the Natl. Legislature, to be
drawn from it, not by ballot, but by lot and
who should retire immediately and make the
election without separating.” While Gouverneur Morris believed the plan worthy of
consideration, Wilson’s plan failed to gain
any traction.
On July 26, after two days of debate
and deliberation, Mason surveyed all the
proposals suggested for the election of the
executive—different modes of popular
election, “election . . . by Electors chosen by
the people,” election by state legislatures
or by state governors, and Wilson’s lottery
scheme—and concluded “that an election
by the Natl. Legislature as originally proposed . . . was the best.” On his motion, the
original provision for a seven-year term with
no reeligibility is adopted by a vote of 6–3
with two states divided. This decision, as we
know, did not settle the matter, nor given its
deficiencies should we have expected it to. If
nothing else, the debates and deliberation to
this juncture, particularly in pointing up the
difficulties associated with the election of the
executive by the legislature, are sufficient to
explain why the eventual resolution of this
issue, election by the Electoral College, was
gratifying to most of the delegates; namely,
it ensured executive independence from the
national legislature, along with a relatively
short term and reeligibility. Added to this,
of course, was the composite nature of the

process that embodied both the federal principle, by providing a role for the states, and
the national principle, by apportioning delegates largely on the basis of state population.
Again, the give and take over this issue
has to be understood in a wider context. The
experiences at the state level, coupled with
the basic strictures of the separation of powers and republicanism principles, provided
the grounds upon which the deliberations
proceeded. Put otherwise, these principles,
perhaps imperfectly provided for in the state
constitutions, were uppermost in the minds
of the delegates. The debates centered not
on the principle itself but over what was
required to ensure its realization in practice.
In the last analysis, this was a matter of judgment. As Morris put it on July 24 amid the
debates over executive-legislative relations,
“It is most difficult of all to rightly balance
the Executive. Make him too weak: The Legislature will usurp his powers: Make him too
strong. He will usurp on the Legislature.”
Bicameralism. On June 20, in the midst
of wide-ranging remarks in the Convention,
Mason noted that while much had been said
about the “unsettled mind of the people of
America,” “he was sure” there were “two
points” upon which “it was well settled,”
namely, “an attachment to Republican Government” and “an attachment to more than
one branch of the legislature.” He went on
to observe that the constitutions of the states
“accord so generally in both these circumstances, that they seem to have been preconcerted.” “This,” he believed, “must either
have been a miracle, or have resulted from
the genius of the people.” Attributing the
attachment to bicameralism to the genius
of the people comes close to the mark, since
there is good reason to believe—contrary
to the supposition that Americans sought
to “copy” the British model—it naturally
evolved over time.
37
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What is widely regarded to be the first
American constitution, the Fundamental
Orders of Connecticut (1639), reveals the
earliest stage of this evolution, with its provision for the election of magistrates and governor by the General Assembly. These magistrates, who are also members of the General
Assembly, assumed executive responsibilities
with the governor. Consequently they can
be seen as standing somewhere between the
legislative and executive departments. An
amendment to the Fundamental Orders in
1645 enhances considerably the magistrates’
legislative dimension by providing that they
vote as a unit within the General Assembly, a
majority of their number being necessary for
the passage of legislation.11 Finally, in keeping with the logic of this change, in 1698
the General Assembly is divided into two
houses—an “Upper House” and a popularly
elected “Lower House”—with the provision
that “no act shall be passed . . . but by the
consent of both houses.”12
The Connecticut evolution is not unique.
In 1644 a Massachusetts ordinance, after
noting “inconveniences” associated with
“magistrates & deputies sitting together” in
one assembly, ordained that “the magistrates
may sit & act business by themselves” and
that their concurrence is necessary for the
enactment of laws.13 Likewise, the Rhode
Island charter was amended in 1666 so that
“the deputyes may sitt apart from the magistrates as a House by themselves; and consequently the magistrates to sitt as a House by
themselves; and that of these two houses may
consist the law makeing power.”14 The move
to bicameral legislatures was not confined
to New England: by 1643, the Governor’s
Council, which had been part of the original
Virginia Grand Assembly, a unitary body
established in 1619, became a separate second
legislative chamber, the other being the House
of Burgesses.15 In fact, Virginia’s bicameral
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arrangement, wherein an appointed governor’s council constituted a second legislative
chamber, is that which eventually emerges in
all the royal and proprietary colonial governments save Pennsylvania and Georgia.
Without going into the details of the constitutions adopted by the states, both before
and after the formal separation from Great
Britain, certain trends should be noted. The
most notable, of course, is that the governor’s
councils—a feature of the royal colonies—
are eliminated, though their functions are
assumed by new constitutional arrangements.
These arrangements varied somewhat. The
New Jersey Constitution of 1776 provided
that an upper chamber, the “Legislative
Council,” should be elected, but provided
as well that the governor, elected by both
Houses, should be “President of the Council,” thereby still linking the council to the
executive. Delaware’s constitution indicates
the path followed by most states: the governor’s council was replaced by an elected body,
the “Council,” which constituted the upper
chamber. In addition, there was provision for
a “privy council” whose duties were primarily
executive in character. The Maryland constitution likewise provided for the election of
the upper house and a “privy council” with
largely executive duties. Following Virginia’s
example, the North Carolina constitution
provides for election to both legislative
chambers and establishes a “Council of State”
whose main function is to “advise the Governor in the execution of his office.”
Quite aside from the more or less natural
evolution, there was widespread agreement for
bicameral legislatures on theoretical grounds.
John Adams’s widely circulated “Thoughts on
Government” (1776), which offered principles
that should guide states in the drafting of
new constitutions in the wake of their independence from Great Britain, was a highly
influential work that defended the necessity
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of bicameralism to maintain liberty. Here
Adams, a proponent of “mixed” government,
indicts unicameral legislatures on various
grounds, the first being the “passion, flight
of enthusiasm . . . or prejudice . . . productive of
hasty results and absurd judgments,” inherent faults that require the steady hand of a
second chamber either to stymie or correct.
Like considerations lead Wilson, the most
democratically inclined convention delegate,
to insist in his 1791 Lectures on Law that a
second chamber was absolutely necessary in
light of the “passions” and “prejudices” of a
single assembly that would, if left unchecked,
eventually produce “despotism, injustice,
and cruelty.”16 In short, the need for a second
chamber was widely recognized across the
political spectrum, a state of affairs that could
not help but be reflected in the Convention.
The composition and character of the
second or “upper” chambers in both the
colonial and the period between the Declaration and the Constitution provided a
consensus, to some degree tacit, on certain
critical issues surrounding the form and
function of the second chamber. To begin
with, in keeping with both the morality and
practice of the colonial and state governments, as well as with the more theoretical
injunctions, they wanted an upper chamber
that would be more sedate and deliberative
than the lower. Above all, it was assumed
that a second chamber, like the councils in
the colonial and state governments, should
closely examine the legislative output of the
lower chamber with an eye to determining
whether it was suitable and, if so, how it
might be improved. To realize this, in turn,
it was understood that the second chamber
should have fewer members than the lower in
order to facilitate the necessary deliberation.
There were still other critical features of a
second chamber upon which there was consensus. That the terms for its members should

be longer than for those of the lower chambers was a widely held position that gained
strength even over the course of the deliberations. On June 12, Randolph proposes
a seven-year term for the upper chamber in
order to ensure “firmness & independence”; a
proposal immediately supported by Madison
on grounds that such a term would provide a
critically needed “stability” in order to check
the excesses of the lower chamber. Later, on
June 26, again expressing his concern that
the second chambers in the states have been
no match for the lower chamber, he again
maintains that “considerable duration ought
to be given” the upper chamber, even terms of
nine years. On the same day, Wilson observes
that in addition to concerns over “anarchy
& tyranny,” the Senate “will probably” have
responsibilities relating to foreign relations
and “treaties” that would render lengthy
terms desirable in order to promote “respectability in the eyes of foreign Nations.”17
In this Wilson is implying that the Senate would share certain functions with the
executive, not unlike the councils and upper
chambers of the colonies and states. And,
not unexpectedly, this turns out to be the
case. Underlying all the formal constitutional provisions relating to term, size, and
functions was a recognition, largely implicit,
but articulated by Madison on June 26,
that a properly constituted second chamber
might well come to be respected by the
people for its “wisdom & virtue,” thereby
posing an effective and republican check
on the ill-conceived measures of the lower
chamber. Setting the minimum age for eligibility for the Senate at thirty, compared with
twenty-five for the House, thereby seeking
to provide for a more mature membership,
may be understood as one small step in this
direction. So, too, was their insistence on
some form of filtered election, another staple
of both the colonial and state governments.
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This consensus is underscored rather
than impaired by Paterson’s proposal for a
unicameral legislature. Paterson’s proposal
was made before consensus emerged that the
new regime would operate on individuals,
thus removing the theoretical motivation
for bicameralism. Paterson’s legislature, like
that of the Articles, was—to borrow John
Adams’s metaphor—less a legislative body
than a diplomatic assembly. The key fact to
observe is that once the Convention agreed
that it would instead function as a Congress
with authority over individuals rather than
states, all parties—including those still
pushing for the states to retain some sovereignty—apparently agreed that a bicameral
legislature was needed.
In sum, while the principled differences
over who or what the Senate should represent
have understandably been a focus of attention
among students of the Convention, what is
often overlooked are the areas of consensus or
substantial agreement that rendered the delegates’ task manageable and the fact that this
consensus arose substantially from experience. Had they begun their deliberations on a
second chamber de novo, without the benefit
of the prior political tradition, it is doubtful
they would have reached any resolution.

T

he foregoing has attempted to establish
that the delegates to the Philadelphia
Constitutional Convention of 1787 began
their work with a broad-based consensus on
core theoretical matters and, further, that
this consensus was guided and bounded by
the long-standing practice of the states. The
importance of this consensus for understanding the American political tradition is myriad.
Most clearly, it underscores the fact that American political institutions are the products of
a steady evolution reaching back to the earliest colonial institutions, not a sudden burst
of innovation in Philadelphia, and still less
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of theoretical contemplation detached from
experience. However, and equally important,
the fact that the framers relied on experience
does not diminish the theoretical sophistication or coherence of their work. This is true
not merely because their gradualism and caution itself arose from a theoretical suspicion of
detached reason. One of the most important
features of the American political tradition
is that it is characterized not by ad hoc institutional design—as Roche suggests—but
rather by theory arising from practice. Put
otherwise, Gentz’s distinction between the
American and French Revolutions was that
the former was not the product of “abstract”
theory. It is far from the case, however, that
a lack of abstract theory indicates an absence
of theoretical grounding altogether. On the
contrary, the American tradition exhibits a
commitment to theory moored to practice.
Roche, arguing otherwise, describes
Madison and Hamilton as “inspired propagandists with a genius for retrospective
symmetry” for having, in The Federalist,
draped the product of a “reform caucus”
in theoretical garb after the fact.18 But this
overlooks the extent to which the theoretical consensus at the Convention arose from
a continuous practice of introspection
nearly two centuries in the making before
the delegates arrived in Philadelphia. Such
institutions as bicameralism and separation
of powers evolved from gradual and cautious
speculation in the states that was anchored
to practice and bounded by awareness of the
limits of abstract reason. The framers’ silence
on many theoretical matters reflects the
extent to which this consensus existed, and
their decision to embrace it, in turn, reflects
both their own theoretical commitment to
gradualism and their inheritance of a long
and coherent theoretical tradition they chose
to retain. That makes the Convention less a
“reform” caucus than a conserving one.
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Finally, the foregoing considerations also
cast serious doubt on Madison’s muchvaunted role as “Father of the Constitution.”
This encomium derives in considerable measure from his presumptive authorship of the
Virginia Plan, which, as we have seen, served
as the basis of the Convention’s substantive
deliberations. Yet the theoretical arguments
Madison adduced within the Convention
and in The Federalist, especially with respect
to separation of powers, seem largely incompatible with core features of the Virginia Plan.
The case is complicated by the fact that only
circumstantial evidence connects Madison to
the plan. He does outline some of its core features in correspondence with Washington as
well as Edmund Randolph in advance of the
Convention, but these letters do not specify
the modes of election—the lower house
electing the upper and each of them electing
the president—that seem incompatible with
his position on separation of powers.19 The
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.

primary elements these letters do specify are
either compatible with long tradition, such
as bicameralism and representation, or—as
in the case of the scope of federal powers—
proved largely uncontroversial because their
necessity was generally seen as self-evident.
As we have seen, the only theoretically novel
device these letters propose is Madison’s much
criticized proposal for a national negative on
state laws. Not only was this device repeatedly defeated, it would not be too much to
say it never received serious consideration—a
fact that concerned Madison enough that he
predicted the Constitution would fail because
of it. This suggests that Madison may have
been accurate, not merely modest, when he
famously described the Constitution as “the
product of many minds.” The overwhelming
influence of tradition on constitutional forms
shows it was the product of many decades as
well.
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